the field (Figure 2). At this point, the duffle bag is entered into inventory as evidence and a chain of custody form is initiated. Swipes are taken from the outer bag to confirm there is no dispersible contamination. The bag and its contents are considered valuable for the investigation by the lead investigator. He determines the duffle bag is safe to transport to RRL for evidence inventory and analysis. The duffle bag and its contents are packaged and sent off to the RRL.]
SBE 2: Receipt of Evidence, Inventory, and Basic Physical Measurements Agent Schwantes from Reimerland's National Law Enforcement Agency (NLEA) seeks assistance by your laboratory (Reimerland Radioanalytical Laboratory -RRL) for the processing and analysis of nuclear forensic and potentially radioactively contaminated evidence. A black duffle bag containing radioactive materials was seized by authorities after the search of a late model Durango-Sport Utility Vehicle that set off radiation portal alarms on October 29, 2013, at approximately 8:23 am at border CP 2. The driver of the vehicle, Amennl Yami (a Reimerland national that has been living in Chicoland for the past 16 years), indicated he was on his way to a construction site located in Reimerland with an industrial instrument containing a radioactive source of 133 Ba. He provided documentation to Customs representatives claiming the possession of this amount of activity/quantity of a radioactive substance is exempt from IAEA transportation regulations. The duffle bag of evidence is received at RRL. The lead investigator indicates the outer portion of the duffle bag has been surveyed and has no detectable dispersible contamination, however, contents within the bag have not yet been surveyed. He instructs the lab staff to inventory the contents within the bag and survey each item for dispersible contamination, while maintaining or initiating chain-of-custody records for each of the pieces of evidence. Lab staff are to segregate, if possible, evidence that do not contain or are not contaminated with nuclear or radioactive materials. Evidence not contaminated with or containing nuclear or radioactive materials should be sent to the NLEA's traditional forensics laboratory. Participants will prepare individual items for gamma spectrometry screening by placing items in secondary containment. After gamma screening and segregating evidence, basic physical measurements (e.g., pictures, mass, dimensions, density) should be performed at RRL on any evidence found to contain or be contaminated with nuclear or radioactive materials.
[The duffle bag will be unpacked initially within a glove bag by participants to ensure contamination control and that evidence is safe to handle and free of dispersible radiological contamination. Items will be swiped and inventoried. All major pieces of evidence will be scanned initially by a low-background NaI(Tl) gamma spectrometer to determine the presence of radioactive materials (students will place items in secondary containment for screening, but no actual screening will be done. Instead, instructors will then identify which items are "radioactive" and which are not 
SBE 4: Gamma Spectroscopy
The Lead Investigator has approved your analytical plan to use gamma spectrometry to confirm the presence of SNM within several of the evidence pieces recovered. RRL staff scientists are approved to conduct gamma ray spectrometry on evidence pieces 3.1.1 and 4.1. The small amount of contamination found on evidence piece 3.3 is not sufficient to justify approval of gamma spectrometry on this item. 
SBE 7: Revised Analytical Plan & Advanced Interpretation I
Authorities have realized that more precise and accurate measurements of evidence piece 3.1.1. are needed to further investigate the origin of this material, based upon your efforts to match the unknown materials up with the State's inventory summarized in the NND. The Lead investigator has requested that you propose a revised analytical plan that will task more advanced capabilities maintained and operated at the National Environmental Radiation Laboratory (NERL) at the Reimerland Institute of Technology. You are familiar with these capabilities because you have collaborated with scientists from this institution many times in the past and RRL has set up a memorandum of understanding between them and NERL for providing analytical assistance in forensic investigations. A list of the Institute's radioanalytical capabilities is provided in Table A Reimerland is a small country of 153,085 square kilometers, located on an isthmus with land borders to the north and south. Reimerland is flat with winding brackish river systems that feed numerous coastal inlets. These river systems frequently overflow during the rainy season producing wide sweeping grasslands and plush forests. Reimerland has a well-established power grid, adequate supplies of potable water, and infrastructure to manage air and water quality. Unemployment is relatively low at approximately 7%.
Population: ~14 million

GDP (purchasing power parity): $250 billion
Industries: Coal, hydro-electric power, timber, ferrous and nonferrous metals, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, food processing. Reimerland operates one Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) reactor for electricity generation and as a resource for various fields of science and education in the nuclear sciences. The reactor incorporates facilities for radioisotope production for medical, industrial and agricultural purposes. Law Enforcement/Legal Environment: Respect for law enforcement is common. Some violent domestic groups have migrated to Reimerland in recent years advocating anarchy and antigovernment sentiments in support of a host of issues including; animal rights, and anti-and pro-nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The splinter group "Oppose Y" supports the agenda of developing a nuclear weapons program to balance power in the region with its pro-nuclear neighboring state Yosemland. Reimerland has a history of settling legal disputes through the court system and using case law for precedence in deciding matters of law and of accepting physical evidence if presented at trial. Local court decisions can be appealed at the national level via the Supreme Court. Reimerland is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Reimerland actively implements UNSCR 1540, among other treaties and international agreements. Reimerland has laws that criminalize the unauthorized possession of more than 500 milligrams of Pu or U enriched with respect to 235 U above natural abundance.
International
Political Climate: Considered somewhat stable, with moderate to high turnout for local and national elections. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons are being publicly debated; currently no new nuclear facilities have been approved.
Public Health Infrastructure:
Widely available private coverage and government subsidized care for low income/unemployed residents.
The Reimerland Ministry of Health has approved the National Environmental Radiation Laboratory (NERL) to provide radioanalytical services to the government and commercial entities. Radiochemical analyses are performed for alpha, beta and gamma emitting radionuclides in a wide range of matrices such as soil, sediment, sludge, water, food, smear test, fauna and flora. The laboratory has its own Quality Assurance (QA) and Management procedures which are accredited to ISO/IEC 17025:2005 by the Reimerland Department of Standards for the analysis of gamma emitting radionuclides. For alpha and beta emitting radionuclides, the laboratory regularly participates in inter-laboratory analysis and proficiency tests organized by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other competent international bodies.
Academic Infrastructure: High rate of literacy and strong educational tradition with post-secondary education offered at low or no cost. Reimerland has a strong university system which emphasizes engineering and the physical sciences. There is significant funding from the government for environmental research within the university system. Reimerland Institute of Technology maintains an analytical chemistry laboratory that provides analysis services to government agencies. Currently, the laboratory is equipped with various analytical instruments, including gamma spectrometers, Inductively Couple Plasma Mass Spectrometer (ICP-MS), Inductively Couple Plasma Optical Emission Spectrometer (ICP-OES), Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometer (GC-MS), Ion Chromatograph, Luminescence Spectrometer and CHNS elemental analyzer. The laboratory adopts good quality control and quality assurance practices in order to provide high quality output, which meets international standards. Chicoland is a country of 267,332 square kilometers with few natural resources and modest agricultural lands. Chicoland is a former nuclear weapons state, having closed its weapons production reactors, its reprocessing and sealed-source manufacturing facilities, its medical isotope production, and nuclear waste facilities. However, Chicoland retains one PWR for domestic power generation. This single power reactor provides domestic power to the most populated centers of manufacturing and commerce along the border with Reimerland. Unemployment has risen to 19% in recent years. The economic downturn associated with rising unemployment has dramatically decreased the GDP of this country.
Population: ~ 28 million
GDP (purchasing power parity): $113.2 billion
Industries: Agriculture provides a modest living for growers and fruit producers in the central region of Chicoland. Manufacturing industries includes textile mills, electronic parts assembly, well-pump manufacture and repair. Chicoland also has a large fishing industry.
International NF Community: Chicoland became a former nuclear weapons state in 1989 and has actively participated in the International NF Community in recent years (ITWG and GICNT). Chicoland has stood up a basic NF capability but it lags in its technical capabilities, relative to its neighbors to the South. Chicoland and Reimerland have formed a regional alliance for investigating nuclear smuggling cases. Chicoland attends the annual International Technical Working Group meetings and has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a member state. Chicoland continues to build its NF technical expertise and analytical capabilities.
Nuclear Forensics Capabilities:
The Federal Law Enforcement Agency (FLEA) of Chicoland has limited capabilities for crime scene management and collecting, categorizing, packaging, and transporting radioactive materials. The agency does, however, maintain a memorandum of understanding with Reimerlands NLEA that enables them to utilize forensic capabilities represented by their partner.
Known Domestic Material:
Chicoland was a nuclear weapons state with reprocessing capabilities until 1989, when it transferred its weapons materials to Yosemland. As part of the weapons program they manufactured medical isotopes and sealed-sources including Pu/Be sources. Many activities connected to the weapons programs languished when the decision was made to terminate its nuclear weapons program.
One PWR remains for domestic power production. Nuclear fuel is sourced from Yosemland and spent nuclear fuel is shipped to Yosemland for reprocessing and disposal.
Law Enforcement/Legal Environment:
Chicoland is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Chicoland actively implements UNSCR 1540, among other treaties and international agreements.
Chicoland has laws that criminalize the unauthorized possession of more than 500 milligrams of weapons useable nuclear material (>20% 235 U, 233 U, Pu). In recent years, Chicoland authorities have seen an increase in nuclear smuggling cases thought to be associated with the lack of security surrounding its historic weapons production facilities.
Political Climate: Adoption of the nuclear disarmament accord (NDA) was widely supported and ratified by federal legislators in 1989. Public support for the NDA was heralded in local and national elections with the exception of a small terrorist group known as the "Oppose Y", referencing their disdain for Yosemland. This group pushed to maintain a strong nuclear weapons program to balance power in the region with Yosemland. Chicoland reached an agreement with Yosemland for reprocessing of future SNF from its civilian power reactor. Disarmament and dismantling of nuclear weapons began in 1992 but dismantling has been slowed due to lack of resources. All materials slated for the weapons stockpile within Chicoland were transferred to Yosemland by 1992. However, significant amounts of SNM contained within the now defunct commercial industries associated with the weapons program remain safeguarded in country. Nuclear power is publically supported but no new nuclear facilities have been licensed.
YOSEMLAND DOSSIER
Government Type: Republic Geography: Yosemland shares its northern border with Reimerland and is also a small country of 172,381 square kilometers. Yosemland's well-established nuclear power infrastructure is located in this region, as is most of the commercial and manufacturing base. The Western region of Yosemland is steeply mountainous with several rivers fed by abundant rainfall. The rivers provide irrigation for agricultural lands in southern Yosemland. Agriculture, although sustainable, employs only a small percentage of the citizens in this populous industrial and manufacturing society. Unemployment averages nearly 10% outside of the growing season.
Population: ~ 26 million
GDP (purchasing power parity): $373.4 billion
Industries: Industrial manufacturing includes integrated circuit production, software development, metalfabrication for automotive and aerospace components, medical isotope production, and some food processing. Agricultural exports include potatoes, corn, sheep, olives, olive oil, and fish. Two stateowned dual-purpose graphite moderated reactors provide commercial power and Pu material for its weapons stockpile. A small portion of this material is diverted for producing commercial grade neutron sources. Three other research reactors produce various medical isotopes. With the exception of sourcing its U ore from Reimerland, Yosemland maintains full U and Pu fuel cycles. Spent nuclear fuel generated in country and accepted from Chicoland and Reimerland is reprocessed and wastes isolated at dedicated facilities. Yosemland supplies all of the LEU fuel used by Reimerland and Chicoland.
International NF Community: Yosemland does not actively participate in meetings and exercises of the nuclear forensics community. The state ownership of the three research reactors and the weapons development programs leaves the nuclear expertise of Yosemland somewhat isolated from the international community.
Nuclear Forensics Capabilities:
Representatives from the National Justice Branch (NJB) have attended GICNT and ITWG meetings sporadically but have never participated in table-top or materials exercises.
Known Domestic Material:
With the exception of having an indigenous supply of uranium ore, Yosemland maintains full uranium and plutonium fuel cycles for nuclear weapons production. Medical isotopes are manufactured at the three research reactors. A portion of the weapons product from its dualuse reactors is also diverted to produce commercial grade neutron sources. Nuclear wastes are stored at dedicated facilities.
Law Enforcement/Legal Environment:
Yosemland laws do not specifically criminalize the unauthorized possession of weapons usable (>20% 235 U, Pu) nuclear material.
Political Climate:
Yosemland reached an agreement with Reimerland in 1992 for uranium ore to supply their research reactors in exchange for purchasing and recycling agreement for its fresh and spent nuclear fuel for 30 years. Yosemland was instrumental in convincing Chicoland to give up its weapons program in 1989 by offering to accept the transfer of Chicoland's remaining weapons stockpile. Nuclear power is publically supported but no new nuclear facilities have been licensed in the last 10 years.
Public Health Infrastructure: Although the state operated health care system provides medical coverage for its citizens the level of care is often very basic. Private medical insurance is too expensive for the vast majority of citizens.
The Yosemland Health Department provides oversight of medical isotope production and sealed source production and management. Thank you for notifying Yosemland of your recent security issues related to the seizure of plutonium in your country. As you know, Yosemland maintains a robust security of its nuclear holdings, the content of which is held as a national secret. Therefore it was no surprise to us, after a cursory review of the analytical data you sent us, that we concluded with the utmost confidence that this material did not originate from our inventory. We wish you luck in your investigation and would appreciate being apprised of any future developments in this case. I wish to thank you for informing Chicoland officials of the recent seizure event in Reimerland involving the attempted smuggling of plutonium across the northern border with Chicoland and want to convey the full support of my office in your endeavor to bring those responsible for this act to justice. As you may know, Chicoland has experienced a rise in similar events within our borders in recent years and I am concerned this latest event in Reimerland may be related to some of those events. For full disclosure I provide a summary of seizures over the past two decades in Chicoland that involved plutonium.
December 12 th , 1995: A man was stopped during a routine traffic stop for an unrelated traffic violation. Upon a search of his vehicle, authorities uncovered 2.3 kg of plutonium metal.
Based upon information we obtained through questioning of the suspect, ensuing undercover investigations were able to recover another 3.5 kg of plutonium metal on February 2 nd , 1996, from an abandoned warehouse in the southern city of Discogringo. We believe that material came from the same source as that material recovered on December 12 th , 1995.
June 1 st , 1999: Chicoland authorities seized 1.1 kg of plutonium powder after they were contacted by a concerned citizen. This individual runs a fishing charter and became suspicious when he was hired to transit five individuals with a large amount of equipment by boat to the Reimerland port of Cliffside. We believe this seizure is unrelated to those that occurred in 1995 and 1996 since the form of this material (powder) and the isotopic composition were significantly different. The material recently seized in Reimerland looks strikingly similar to some of the materials seized in our Country starting in 1999, which are all oxide powders with similar isotopic composition to your materials. This material, however, appears to be significantly different than the Pu metal seized within our country in 1995 and 1996. We believe we know where the Pu metal originated from. We suspect this material was historically in Chicoland's nuclear inventory up to 1994. In that year, 27 kg of special nuclear material (nominally 98% Pu metal alloyed with Beryllium) was stolen from a facility that used to make commercial neutron sources by diverting a small portion of the country's product materials destined for its weapons stockpile. That facility closed down in 1992 after the country decided to abandon its weapons program in 1989. Since 1992, all 112 kg of the remaining Pu-Be neutron source inventory was stored and safeguarded in place until the 1994 incident. However, we still do not know the origin of the Pu oxide powders that have been the focus of more recent seizures within our country. Please let us know if you concur with our assessment.
The trafficking of special nuclear material is of the highest interest to Chicoland authorities. As such we would appreciate the opportunity to work with Reimerland authorities to bring those responsible to justice.
Sincerely, Pu parent / daughter relationship. Light, medium, medium dark and dark red shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval around the datapoint for the unknown measured by gamma ray spectrometry, alpha spectrometry, ICP-MS, and MC-ICP-MS, respectively.
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